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Abstract
Episodic memory—memory for personally experienced past events—seems to afford
a distinctive kind of cognitive contact with the past. This makes it natural to think that
episodic memory is centrally involved in our understanding of what it is for something
to be in the past, or to be located in time—that it is either necessary or sufficient for such
understanding. If this were the case, it would suggest certain straightforward evidential
connections between temporal cognition and episodic memory in nonhuman animals.
In this paper, I argue that matters are more complicated than this. Episodic memory is
memory for events and not for the times they occupy. As such, it is dissociable from
temporal understanding. This is not to say that episodic memory and temporal cogni-
tion are unrelated, but that the relationship between them cannot be straightforwardly
captured by claims about necessity and sufficiency. This should inform our theoretical
predictions about the manifestations of episodic memory in nonhuman behaviour.
Keywords Episodic memory · Temporal cognition · Comparative psychology ·
Memory · Dependency thesis
1 Introduction
Episodic memory—memory for personally experienced past events—seems to afford
a kind of cognitive contactwith the past not provided for by semanticmemory. Episodic
recollection characteristically involves ‘mentally reliving’ past events: when I remem-
ber falling over as a child and skinning my knee there is a sense of being ‘back there’,
seeing what I saw and feeling what I felt. As Matthew Soteriou puts it, in episodic
memory, the past is ‘made present’ (2018). Semantic memory, by contrast, is typically
construed as a store of decontextualized general knowledge. When I recall that Ap Lei
Chau is the third most densely populated island in the world, I’m recalling something
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learned in the past, but the past doesn’t figure in the memory. My remembering does
not mentally transport me to another time.
Given that episodicmemory affords this cognitive contactwith the past, it’s tempting
to think that episodic memory is centrally involved in our understanding of what it
is for something to be in the past—or more generally, what it is for something to be
located in time. Bertrand Russell expresses a version of this thought when he writes,
‘but for the fact of memory in this sense we should not know that there ever was a past
at all, nor should we be able to understand the word “past”, any more than a man born
blind can understand the word “light”’ (2001, p. 66). Similarly, Ludwig Wittgenstein
claims that ‘a person learns the concept of the past by remembering’ (2009, pt. II
§370).1
These claims express a pair of distinct but related ideas. The first is that episodic
memory is necessary for possessing a concept of the past. This claim has been labelled
the ‘dependency thesis’ (Hoerl 2017); I discuss it briefly in Sect. 2. But my central
interest is in the second claim: that it is through remembering that we acquire a concept
of the past. A strong reading of this claim might be labelled the ‘sufficiency thesis’:
it would say that episodic memory is sufficient for possessing a concept of the past.
When this is married with the idea that episodic memory is a particular application of a
more general faculty for mental time travel, it becomes tempting to think that episodic
memory is what provides for temporal representation in general—an understanding
not only of the past, but of time as a dimension stretching into both the past and the
future. Thomas Suddendorf and Michael Corballis suggest as much when they write
that ‘the mental reconstruction of past events […] may have been responsible for the
concept of time itself’ (2007, p. 301).
This thought underpins a close association between episodic memory and tem-
poral cognition in comparative psychological research. Investigations into whether
animals have episodic memory are often framed in terms of whether they are ‘stuck
in time’ (e.g. Clayton et al. 2009; Zentall 2005). Frequently, this work also features
discussion of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis, according to which humans are unique
in their capacity to anticipate future desires or needs—a hypothesis which does not,
on its face, concern episodic memory (Bischof-Köhler 1985). The underlying thought
seems to be this: if animals lack episodic memory, they lack any capacity to represent
time—and conversely, if they have episodic memory, they can represent time. So, on
this view there is a straightforward evidential relationship between episodic memory
and temporal cognition: evidence for temporal cognition in animals would support
the hypothesis that they have episodic memory, and a lack of evidence of nonhuman
temporal cognition would undermine it. As Suddendorf (2013, p. 110) writes, for
instance, ‘the best evidence for episodic memory should come from signs of episodic
foresight […] yet animals do not overtly express any of the obvious manifestations of
such a capacity’.
My goal in this paper is to explore the relationship between episodic memory
and temporal cognition, with a view to determining whether we should expect that a
creaturewith episodicmemorywill be able to represent time. I argue thatwe should not.
1 Neither Russell nor Wittgenstein used the term ‘episodic memory’, but context suggests this is what they
had in mind.
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If we begin with an account of episodic memory which is adequate with respect to the
theoretical role episodic memory is supposed to occupy, we can see that there might
be creatures with episodic memory which were nevertheless incapable of temporal
thought. If this is right, failure to find convincing evidence of temporal cognition
would not count against the hypothesis that animals had episodic memory.2 This is
not to say that there are no interesting connections between episodic memory and
temporal cognition. On the contrary, I suggest that there are: episodic memory may
play a role in the development of temporal concepts, and temporal concepts may
expand the roles that episodic memory can play in a creature’s mental life. These
complex relationships should inform our predictions about how episodic memory
would manifest in nonverbal behaviour.
2 The dependency thesis
Discussions of the relationship between episodicmemory and temporal cognition have
focussed largely on the dependency thesis, according to which episodic memory is
necessary for possessing temporal concepts. The thesis can be fleshed out in different
ways.
First, the temporal concepts under discussion may vary. Some discussion has
focussed on the concept of the past, where representing something as having occurred
in the past involves appreciating that it cannot be undone, and that it has an irre-
versible causal significance for what happens now, and perhaps in the future (Hoerl
1999). More recently, Christoph Hoerl has defended a version of the thesis accord-
ing to which episodic memory is necessary for possessing a ‘realist conception of
time’—representing time as a continuous domain in which all times are temporally
related to one another, and which exists independently of the particular events occu-
pying it (2017).
Second, there aredevelopmental and constitutiveversions of the thesis (Hoerl 2017).
The developmental dependency thesis claims that one must have episodic memory in
order to develop temporal concepts. On this view, once temporal concepts are estab-
lished they can remain intact even if episodic memory is abolished. The constitutive
dependency thesis makes the stronger claim that episodic memory is partly constitu-
tive of temporal understanding—meaning that a loss of episodic memory also results
in a loss of temporal concepts.
Amnesia provides reasons for doubting the dependency thesis, at least in its con-
stitutive forms. Carl Craver and colleagues conducted interviews with the amnesiac
known as K.C. to determine the extent of his temporal understanding. They found that
K.C. understood that the past is ‘events that have already happened’; that ‘once an
event is in the past, it will always stay in the past, and that it is not possible for someone
to undo a murder at some time after the murder has occurred’ (Craver 2012, p. 465).
So, it appears that K.C. retained his concept of the past. It also seems that he retained
2 I don’t claim that psychologists have failed to find evidence temporal cognition in animals, which is a
subject of some controversy. Similarly, I take no position on whether animals have episodic memory, which
is another controversial question. My interest is in the theoretical and evidential relationship between these
controversies.
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a realist conception of time. He understood time ‘as a series of events ordered earlier
or later than one another, irrespective of any reference to the present’ (Craver et al.
2014, p. 192)—suggesting an understanding of time as an internally connected linear
domain. He also appeared to understand the semantics of regret, saying that to regret
something is to ‘wish that you hadn’t done’ it, and his behaviour suggested sensitivity
to anticipated regret (Craver et al. 2014, p. 194). This is significant since regret is
typically construed as a counterfactual emotion. To regret an event is to treat the time
at which it occurred as a time at which something else could have happened, sug-
gesting an event-independent conception of time—the second component of a realist
conception.
Against this, Hoerl (2017) has recently argued that the interviews with K.C. suggest
an impaired understanding of regret, since although K.C. was able to say something
about what regret means, he was unable to think of a single thing that he himself
regretted. This is surprising, given the many regrettable events in his life—including
the head injury that gave rise to his amnesia—and given he knew these events had
occurred. So, it is at least surprising that he did not claim to regret them. He was
also unable to name anything that his mother or Richard Nixon might regret (Craver
et al. 2014, p. 194). Hoerl proposes that this is indicative of a failure to appreciate the
event-independence of time—a failure to realise (for instance) that the time at which
his head injury occurred, something else might have happened instead (2017, p. 215).
Whilst I doubt that Hoerl intends K.C.’s remarks to be more than suggestive evi-
dence, there are limits to the conclusions we can draw from cases of amnesia. If
somebody with amnesia has a certain capacity, then it is safe to assume that episodic
memory is not necessary for that capacity. But if someone with episodic memory
lacks a capacity, it is not safe to conclude that episodic memory is necessary for that
capacity. First, brain damage is rarely so localised as to be limited to the brain areas
responsible for episodic memory, often coming along with damage to other unrelated
brain areas. If K.C. suffered damage to other parts of his brain, this may explain his
lack of regrets. Second, brain areas often perform more than one function. The hip-
pocampus, central to episodic recollection, also plays a central role in the construction
of imagined scenarios (Hassabis et al. 2007). It may be that K.C. struggles to name
things that he regrets not because he lacks episodic memory, and perhaps not even
because he lacks an event-independent understanding of time, but because he is unable
to imaginatively construct counterfactual scenarios that would not have been regret-
table, making the possibility of regret less salient. So, it is not clear that there’s any
particularly compelling reason to think that K.C. lacks a realist conception of time,
or—if he does—that this is as a result of his episodic memory deficits.
All this casts doubt on the dependency thesis, at least in its constitutive form—but
onemight note that sinceK.C.was an adult-onset amnesiac, his case leaves the develop-
mental dependency thesis untouched. There is little published work that bears directly
on this, meaning there is little positive reason to accept it beside its intuitive plausi-
bility. Moreover, it’s reasonable to think that if there were systematic deficiencies in
temporal understanding in developmental amnesia, this would have been noted and
reported. Yet, to my knowledge, no studies of developmental amnesia do report this.
In fact, one widely known account of three individuals with developmental amnesia
found that although they displayed the usual impairments with respect to memory,
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navigation, keeping appointments and so on, they achieved strikingly average perfor-
mance in mainstream education and on a range of cognitive tests (Vargha-Khadem
et al. 1997). Their language skills were normal, and they understood and replied to
questions in the past tense. So, there is at least some reason to doubt the developmental
dependency thesis, too.
Of course, this is by no means a conclusive refutation of the dependency thesis.
And of course, even if it turned out that episodic memory was not necessary for the
development and maintenance of temporal understanding, it might nevertheless play a
role in the development andmaintenance of such understanding in healthy individuals.
It might even be that episodic memory is sufficient for such understanding. But this all
leaves open a substantial question: what is it about episodic memory that is supposed
to underpin its connection to temporal cognition? How, precisely, might episodic
memory be involved in furnishing a (healthy) individual with an understanding of
time? As I argue in what follows, it is just not clear that episodic memory is the kind
of thing that could furnish one with temporal understanding.
3 What is episodic memory?
Saying anything about the relationship between episodic memory and the represen-
tation of time requires arriving at a view about what episodic memory is. This is not
an easy question, and what I say about it in this section will be unavoidably brief. In
particular, I shall largely set aside an ongoing debate in the metaphysics of memory
between causal and simulationist accounts of memory, on which the following should
be neutral (see Michaelian and Robins 2018). My concern here is with what features
should be taken to characterise episodic memory for the purposes of psychological
research. I begin by introducing Endel Tulving’s account of episodic memory, before
arguing that amore inclusive account inwhich episodicmemory ismore sparsely char-
acterised better satisfies the theoretical ends for which the term ‘episodic memory’
was introduced.
The term ‘episodic memory’ was introduced by Tulving in (1972). He wrote that
‘most terms referring to different kinds of memory serve the function of dividing some
larger domain of memory […] into smaller areas within which empirical observations
and theoretical propositions are thought to be generalisable. Such divisions frequently
take the form of a dichotomy: two complementary categories exhaust a superordinate
category’ (1972, pp. 382–383). It was with this in view that he proposed the term
‘episodic memory’, to pick out that part of declarative memory which is not semantic
memory. At root, the distinction was between the sort of memory involved in remem-
bering the meaning of the word, and that involved in remembering an occasion on
which the word was presented. As Tulving sometimes points out, the distinction is
somewhat captured by the contrast between ordinary uses of the words ‘remember’
and ‘know’.
Tulving went on to offer and develop a theoretical account of episodic memory. In
early work, he characterised episodic memory as a store of information about ‘tem-
porally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events’
(1972, p. 385); the content of an episodic memory on this view is of the form ‘I did
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such and such, in such and such a place, at such and such a time’ (1972, p. 389). This
was later distilled into the ‘what-where-when’ criterion for episodic memory, which
was the basis for the pioneering study on nonhuman episodic memory in scrub-jays
(Clayton and Dickinson 1998). However, Tulving came to doubt that the distinctive
features of episodic memory could be captured in terms of this kind of representational
content. One part of the worry is that semantic memories can have what-where-when
content. Another is that many episodic memories seem to lack one or more of these
kinds of content. In later work, he focussed on episodic memory’s phenomenological
features. In particular, he proposed that episodic memory characteristically involves
a distinctive form of self-consciousness he calls ‘autonoesis’, as well as a special
awareness of time he labels ‘chronesthesia’ (2005, p. 14).
It has become more or less conventional to defer to Tulving on the question of
what episodic memory is. One reason that this is problematic is that Tulving offers
little theoretical clarity about what autonoesis or chronesthesia, which he takes to
be its central components, are supposed to be. He characterises chronesthesia as an
awareness of ‘subjective time’, which is ‘related to but not identical with physical time’
(2005, p. 16). Subjective time is described as the time ‘inwhichweexist’ (2002, p. 311),
the time ‘throughwhich wementally travel’ (2002, p. 311) and ‘the thought about time
inwhich one’s personal experiences take place’ (2002, p. 313). These ideas are obscure
and as I’ve argued elsewhere (Boyle 2019b, p. 5), non-equivalent. Autonoesis, in
turn, is characterised as ‘the kind of conscious awareness that characterises conscious
recollection’ (2005, p. 15), and as the possession of a ‘projectable, or time-travelling, or
remembering self’ (2005, p. 29). The former is not explanatory; the latter is difficult to
disentangle from chronesthesia. Tulving also offers a number of non-equivalent claims
about the relationship between episodic memory and autonoesis—characterising the
latter variously as something that ‘accompanies’ episodic memory (2005, p. 11), an
‘integral component’ of episodic memory (2005, p. 31), a ‘medium’ through which
episodic memory occurs (2005, p. 9), and something on which episodic memory
‘critically depend[s]’ (2005, p. 30).
Moreover, both autonoesis and chronesthesia are treated as distinctive forms of
awareness, which can’t be reduced to or captured in terms of the representational
content of memory. And yet both are described in richly conceptual terms—leading
some to interpret them as requiring a high degree of cognitive sophistication. Kourken
Michaelian, for instance, writes that ‘in light of the cognitive sophistication presup-
posed by the phenomenology of mental time travel, which involves both a sense of self
and a sense of subjective time, it seems unlikely that nonhuman species are capable
of undergoing the relevant phenomenology’ (2016, p. 208). It isn’t entirely clear how
to reconcile the idea that these features of episodic memory are forms of experience
with the idea that they require this cognitive or conceptual sophistication.
Quite aside from these interpretative issues, there is another reason it is problematic
to treat Tulving’s accounts of episodic memory as authoritative on the question of
what episodic memory is—namely, that these accounts are highly speculative. Tulving
acknowledges this: for instance, he offers chronesthesia up as an idea for consideration,
but grants that there are legitimate questions about whether it exists (2002, p. 321).
He does offer some evidence in support of his theoretical claims—but this evidence,
primarily drawn from cases of amnesia, seems to bear more on the existence of a
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distinction between semantic and episodic memory than on more speculative claims
about unique forms of awareness characteristic of the latter. For instance, Tulving
claims that K.C. is deficient in autonoetic awareness. But the evidence offered in
support of this claim is simply that K.C. is ‘densely’ episodically amnesic (2005,
p. 26)—and it is unclear that this motivates any further claim about his sense of self.
How, then, ought we to characterise episodic memory? Here, I think it’s helpful to
return to the purposes for which the term ‘episodic memory’ was introduced. First, the
termwas introduced tomark an exhaustive division in declarativememory, between the
kind of memory involved in knowing things and that involved in recollecting—where
‘episodic memory’ picks out the latter. Second, the term is supposed to pick out a
class ‘within which empirical observations and theoretical propositions are thought to
be generalisable’. To a philosopher, it’s natural to paraphrase this in terms of natural
kinds: the distinction between episodic and semantic memory is supposed to mark a
‘joint’ in nature, and ‘episodic memory’ is intended to pick out a psychological natural
kind falling on one side of this joint. So, if there is no psychologically real division in
declarative memory, the term ‘episodic memory’ will fail to refer.
A compelling reason for thinking that there is a psychologically real division in
declarative memory is provided by the existence of functionally different forms of
amnesia with different causal histories. Damage to the neocortex results in semantic
memory loss, or (less question-beggingly) an inability to retrieve previously acquired
general knowledge, but does not result in an inability to recollect past events. Dam-
age to the medial-temporal lobe (MTL)—such as that suffered by K.C.—results in a
loss of memory for past experiences, but does not damage existing stores of general
knowledge. The dissociations between the two types of memory aren’t clean, since
general knowledge and memory for events seem to interact in various ways. Most dra-
matically, individuals with MTL amnesia are also severely impaired in their ability to
acquire new general knowledge, even whilst their existing stores of general knowledge
remain intact (Elward and Vargha-Khadem 2018; Manns et al. 2003). Nevertheless,
this pattern of dissociability suggests that there is a psychologically real distinction
to be drawn—that within declarative memory there are two less inclusive kinds of
memory about which theoretical and empirical claims might generalise.
This makes it reasonable to treat ‘episodic memory’ as picking out the kind of
declarative memory that isn’t semantic, and which is lost in MTL amnesia. David
Rubin and Sharda Umanath (2015) propose that this is a very inclusive kind—more
inclusive than Tulving’s accounts of episodic memory would suggest.3 They argue
that ‘the fundamental natural kind that is an opposition to knowledge (i.e., semantic
memory)’ (p. 2) is what they term ‘event memory’, where an event memory is one
involving ‘amental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence’ (p. 1)—that
is, involving a ‘single spatially organised scene’ (p. 7). On their account, ‘the scene
can be experienced as happening to the person recalling it or imagined as happening
to another person’—that is, in either field or observer perspective (p. 1). It may, but
need not, represent actions, actors or emotions (p. 1), and it might result from the
encoding of a single event, or be a merging together of several encodings of similar
events (p. 2). In the latter case, Rubin and Umanath suggest, the remembering subject
3 All page references in this paragraph refer to this 2015 paper.
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might take the memory to represent a single event or to represent a ‘prototype’ event
(p. 7). Their claim that event memories are ‘recalled as a single occurrence’ should
consequently not be taken to indicate that an event memorymust represent, or be taken
by the subject to represent, a particular event that occurred at a particular point in time.
Rather, it indicates that the retrieved event details are integrated into a single spatial
representation as of a single scene or event.
Rubin and Umanath argue that this inclusive category is what’s required if the goal
is to exhaustively partition declarative memory. The episodic/semantic memory dis-
tinction suggested by Tulving’s account, they argue, ‘provides no clear classification
for memories that are recalled as single events but that are imagined from the perspec-
tive of a protagonist who is not the person recalling the event, or that are the merging
of more than one similar occurrences, or that are recalled without a sense of reliving’
(p. 2).
The point is not that Tulving’s account leaves us with marginal cases in which it’s
unclear how a given memory should be classified. The natural world is messy enough
that we should expect marginal cases to arise for any plausible account of episodic
memory. Nor is it that, for instance, autonoesis isn’t essential to episodic memory,
since there are some cases of memories that would naturally be described as episodic,
in which we remember from another’s perspective. Again, messiness in the natural
world makes it unreasonable to expect an account of episodic memory to define its
‘essence’ or to give necessary conditions for its occurrence. Prominent accounts of
natural kinds allow for precisely these kinds of messiness (e.g. Boyd 1989, 1991).
Rather, the point is that the class of declarative memories that are not semantic
is far more diverse than Tulving’s account of episodic memory would suggest—it
includes many memories that don’t involve any rich sense of self-awareness or tempo-
ral extension, memories constructed from third-personal perspectives and memories
that aren’t for unique events, as well as memories that lack what-where-when content.
An adequate account of this class of memories need not provide necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for class membership, but ought to capture what, in general, members
of the class have in common and what underpins those commonalities. Rubin and
Umanath argue that what unites these memories is that they involve spatially struc-
tured scene constructions, and that this similarity is underpinned by the involvement
of ‘neural structures in the medial temporal lobes and the visual ventral stream that
are needed for the construction and experiencing of scenes’ (2015, p. 8).
At this point one might worry that event memory, as described here, scarcely quali-
fies as a form ofmemory at all.We deploy the capacity to construct integrated, spatially
structured representations of scenes when we invent scenarios out of whole cloth. On
the assumption that these imaginings are not memories, there must either be more to
event memory than has been said here, or event memory is not a form of memory at
all.4 The answer is that there is more to event memory than the construction of spa-
tial scenes. Rubin and Umanath are primarily concerned with drawing a distinction
between two forms of memory, rather than between memory and imagination. On the
account they offer, event memories are thosememorieswhich involve the construction
of a single spatially organised scene, and can be contrasted with semantic memories,
4 Thanks to a reviewer for pressing me on this.
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which do not. This takes the mnemonic status of event memories for granted, leaving
open the question of precisely what this mnemonic status consists in, and how event
memories differ from mere imaginings of events.
What makes something a memory, and in particular what distinguishes memories
from mere imaginings, is the subject of a rich and ongoing debate. There are a wide
range of views on this question, but speaking very broadly, we can characterise this
as a debate between causal and simulationist theories of memory (De Brigard 2017;
Michaelian and Robins 2018). Causal theorists argue that a memory must stand in
an ‘appropriate causal connection’ to the remembered event (Bernecker 2010; Martin
and Deutscher 1966). Simulationists, on the other hand, have argued that memories
are scene constructions produced by systems or processes that tend reliably to produce
accurate representations of past events (Michaelian 2016), whether or not this involves
a causal connection of the sort invoked by causal theorists. Rubin and Umanath char-
acterise event memory in the language of encoding and retrieval, perhaps suggesting
an affinity for the causal view: event memories are constructed out of information
encoded during the event(s) being represented. But their account is compatible with
either position on the metaphysics of memory, and since nothing in what follows turns
on the choice between them, the reader may continue with their preferred account in
mind.5
Summarising, Rubin and Umanath argue that the contrast class for semantic
memory is event memory, where event memories are those memories involving the
construction of a single spatially organised scene. In offering this account, Rubin and
Umanath do not explicitly take themselves to be offering a revisionary account of
episodic memory—they seem happy to surrender the term ‘episodic memory’ to those
who, like Tulving, want to build more phenomenological and conceptual richness into
the phenomenon. So, they use ‘episodic memory’ to pick out a special case of event
memory. It’s worth acknowledging that others have also used the terms ‘episodicmem-
ory’ and ‘event memory’ to draw a contrast between more and less complex forms of
memory for events. For instance, JohannesMahr andGergelyCsibra (2018) reserve the
term ‘episodic memory’ for event memories embedded under a metarepresentational
attitude of remembering. And Nazim Keven (2016) argues for a distinction between
event memories which are perceptual snapshots of earlier events and episodic memo-
ries, which also have temporal and causal structure and relate remembered events to
the subject’s goals.
However, I have argued that there are good reasons for taking ‘episodic memory’ to
pick out the type of declarative memory that is not semantic: marking this fundamental
division in declarative memory is the central theoretical work the episodic/semantic
distinction is supposed to do. And Rubin and Umanath argue that the basic division
in declarative memory is not between episodic memory, in any of these narrower
senses, and semantic memory, but between event memory, in their sense, and semantic
memory. So, I suggest that we should take their account to be an account of episodic
memory. That is, we should take episodic memory to be event memory, in Rubin and
Umanath’s sense: to have an episodic memory is to have a memory involving a single
5 Note that this debate is about whatmakes something a memory, rather than an imagining or anything else.
This is distinct from the question of how a subject or cognitive system distinguishes between memories and
other instances of scene construction, which I discuss in Sect. 4.
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spatially organised mental construction of a scene.6 In what follows, I shall explore
the relationship between episodic memory and representing time with this inclusive
conception of episodic memory in mind. I return to narrower conceptions of episodic
memory towards the end of Sect. 4.
4 Representing time
When Russell claims that episodic memory is at the heart of our understanding of the
past, he writes that this is because episodic memory gives us ‘immediate knowledge’
of the past (2001, p. 26). Similarly, Hoerl (1999, p. 246) argues that episodic memory
is central to possessing a concept of the past because episodic memories make one
‘directly aware of […] the fact that past events impose certain constraints on the
present’. These claims of ‘direct’ or ‘immediate awareness’ suggest a view of episodic
memory according to which having episodic memory is sufficient for possessing a
concept of the past. But the account of episodic memory as event memory, offered
in Sect. 3, makes this view difficult to sustain. On that view, it is not clear why one
ought to think that an episodic memory of an event will wear its causal or temporal
connection to the present on its sleeve, such that the temporal or causal relationship
a remembered event stands into the present will be transparent to the remembering
subject.
The issue is not with the idea that episodic memory involves ‘immediate’ or ‘direct’
awareness of a remembered event. Let’s take ‘immediate’ or ‘direct’ to mean some-
thing like ‘not mediated by inference’, and let’s grant for the sake of argument that
episodicmemory provides immediate or direct awareness to remembered events.What
is not clear is whywe should think that episodic memories provide immediate or direct
awareness of precisely this feature of a remembered event: that it occurred at some
(particular) past time and constrains the present. This is not obvious because episodic
memories are spatial scene constructions, which need not contain temporal informa-
tion. Of course, many episodic memories do have what we might call an ‘internal’
temporal structure, which is to say that they may carry information about the remem-
bered event’s duration or the order in which its constituent parts occurred (see Boyle
2019b; Cheng andWerning 2016). So, insofar as they provide direct access to remem-
bered events, it’s reasonable to take them to provide direct access to these internal
temporal properties. It is quite another thing to suppose that, in remembering, one is
directly aware of what we might call an event’s external temporal properties—that is,
where in time the remembered event is situated. This just isn’t central to what episodic
memories are, on the account I’ve offered.
One might be tempted to treat this as an oversight in that account: perhaps we
should add that episodic memories provide for a direct awareness of events as having
occurred at some (particular) past time. But in fact, there are good reasons for not
taking direct awareness of external temporal properties to be a characteristic feature
6 It is of course compatible with this that there are important distinctions, even differences in kind, within
the category of episodic memory. For instance, if Keven is correct that memories with temporal, causal
and teleological structure form a unified category within which theoretical and empirical claims might
generalise, then these would be an important sub-kind of episodic memory, on this view.
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of episodic memory. First, there are clearly a great many cases in which we have
episodic memories for events we are unable to temporally locate. I have a certain
memory of taking a trip to the beach, but could not tell you when this happened.
Second, insofar as we are able to locate remembered events in time, this is unlikely
to be because memories make one directly aware of a remembered event’s external
temporal properties. Rather, it is because we are able to exploit our general knowledge
about temporal patterns and about our life history, and use contextual information
provided by the memory to infer its location in time (Friedman 1993, p. 58). For
instance, I know that when I fell over and skinned my knee, I must have been between
the ages of two and seven, since this memory unfolds in the garden of a house I know
I only lived in between those ages. But my memory of the beach trip is sparse, and
provides me with no contextual cues I can use to locate it in time.
Of course, one might point out that I am still at least able to say that this beach
trip happened at some point in the past—I know that my representation of this event
is not the product of imagination. This is true—but it’s again unclear that this is to be
explained in termsof an immediate or direct awareness of the pastness of the event, such
that any subject who had this memory would necessarily recognise the remembered
event as belonging to the past.Whilst mymemorymay have a phenomenal quality that
my imaginings typically lack, as a result of which I am inclined to believe it represents
a past event, we should not be too quick to assume that this felt quality amounts to a
direct awareness of the pastness of events.
The ability to distinguish between memories and imaginings comprises two prob-
lems: the source problem, and the process problem (Michaelian 2016, Chapter 9). The
source problem is the problem of determining whether information currently being
remembered has its origins in experience, testimony, my previous imaginings, or some
other source. The process problem is the prior problem of determining whether the
cognitive process in which I am currently engaged is one of remembering or imagin-
ing. According to the ‘source monitoring’ framework, the source problem is solved
by metacognitive processes which ‘infer’ the likely source of a memory on the basis
of features of the memory itself—such as the amount and type of perceptual detail it
provides, and its fit with background knowledge and other memories (Johnson et al.
1993). The underlying thought is that there are average differenceswith respect to these
features between memories with different sources. Michaelian (2016, pp. 194–198)
argues that the process problem is solved in a similar way, by a metacognitive pro-
cess that infers the likely cognitive process based on features of the representation it
outputs, including affective valence and intensity, level of detail, and familiarity.
Whilst these inferences about the source of a representation may sometimes be
drawn consciously on the basis of deliberate reflection, inmany cases they occur below
the level of awareness: ‘heuristic source attributions take place constantly without
notice, and are relatively automatic or effortless’ (Johnson and Raye 2000). In the
latter case, these ‘inferences’ cannot plausibly be attributed to the agent, but are better
understood as ‘occurring at the level of the system’ (Michaelian 2016, p. 165). In
these cases, these processes give rise to phenomenal differences betweenmemories and
imaginations, in the form of ‘metacognitive feelings’ (Michaelian 2016, p. 196). These
feelings may ground a willingness to assign memories episodic epistemic significance
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that is not to be assigned to imaginings, without the agent being aware of the reasons
for their willingness.
Given what we—adult humans—know about the relationship betweenmemory and
the past, the presence of metacognitive feelings characteristic of memory gives us a
reason to think that the remembered event belongs in the ‘personal past’ (Johnson et al.
1993, p. 21). As a result, we may be inclined to call this feeling a ‘feeling of pastness’.
Nevertheless, the feeling is not a direct awareness of the pastness of the event, but
the qualitative outcome of a metacognitive monitoring process. It might just as well
be designated a feeling of reality, authenticity, epistemic significance or anything
else: it is simply a feeling that prompts subjects to assign the memory an epistemic
significance not to be assigned to imaginings. In a creature lacking temporal concepts,
similar metacognitive feelings could ground a capacity to discriminate memories from
imaginings, and to assign epistemic significance to the former but not the latter, without
giving rise to a belief that remembered events occurred at some point in the past.
The point, for my purposes, is that if episodic memory and locating remembered
events in the past are separable phenomena, then there could be creatures which have
episodic memory and which are nevertheless unable to locate remembered events
in the past. And I’ve argued that these are separable phenomena. Having episodic
memories, in the sense I’ve outlined, does not entail appreciating the pastness of those
events, and nor does the capacity to discriminate episodic memories from imaginings.
If that’s right, then we ought not to expect (for instance) that creatures with episodic
memory will treat remembered events as past in Hoerl’s sense of causally constraining
the present, or that they will possess any other kind of temporal understanding.
But, onemight reasonably ask, what is it to assign amemory epistemic significance,
if it is not to treat it as representing a past event—one that happened at a particular
(perhaps unknown) point in the past? And moreover, what good can episodic memory
do, if it does not involve locating remembered events in time? It is one thing to say that
remembering events and locating them in time are separable phenomena in theory, but
quite another to say what cognitive work ‘temporally unanchored’ episodic memories
might do. If they could playnouseful or adaptive role in a creature’s cognitive economy,
it’s unclear why we should take seriously the possibility that any creatures have them.
Hoerl and McCormack (2019, p. 4) express this kind of concern, noting that it is
unclear how such temporally unanchored event representations could systematically
or purposively guide action.
Broadly speaking, I suggest that assigning epistemic significance to a memory
means taking it to accurately represent some feature of theworld, being inclined to form
beliefs about the world on this basis and treat those beliefs as rational constraints on
decisionmaking. Standardly,we take episodicmemories to have epistemic significance
with respect to what happened in the past (Debus 2010). But as I’ll explore in more
detail below, there are at least two other ways in which one might take an episodic
memory to be epistemically significant, besides by taking it to provide information
about the past. First, onemight take amemory to accurately represent how things are in
the world now. For instance, suppose I have a memory in which my path is blocked by
a fallen tree. Even if I do not recognise that thismemory represents a past event, I might
take it to have epistemic significance with respect to how the world is now: the path
is blocked by a fallen tree. Second, one might take a memory to provide information
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about kinds of events, indicating what tends to happen in certain circumstances. For
instance, suppose I have a memory of being bitten by the neighbour’s dog in her yard.
Again, without recognising that this memory represents a past event, I might take it to
have epistemic significance with respect to the sort of event that’s likely to occur if I
go into the neighbour’s yard. Taking episodic memories to have epistemic significance
in either of these senses provides for several roles episodic memories might adaptively
play in the cognitive economies of creatures lacking any temporal concepts.
First, as Hoerl andMcCormack (2019) argue, creatures which do not represent time
may nevertheless have what they call a ‘temporal updating system’—that is, a system
for keeping track of the current state of the world. One way to do this would be to
have a single map-like representation of one’s environment, and update it as one goes
about the world to reflect the arrangement of objects one finds. But this is not the only
way to keep track of the state of things. One might also store an episodic memory
relating to one’s most recent experience at various places and consult this as a record
of how things are arranged in the world. So, for instance, suppose I am wondering
where my keys are, and a recent memory occurs to me in which my keys have fallen
behind a piece of furniture. Even if I lack a concept of the past, I might take this
memory to provide information about where the keys are now, which might prompt
me to look for them behind the furniture. A creature who used episodic memories only
in this way—as a source of information about how things are—would have no need
for locating remembered events in time.
One might object that using episodic memories as part of a temporal updating
system in this way could not possibly be adaptive.7 If subjects do not believe that the
events being remembered in fact occurred, it would be irrational for them to use these
memories to inform their model of the present state of the world. But whether it is
rational for subjects to form beliefs in this way is a distinct question from whether it is
adaptive. It would bemaladaptive if subjects were disposed to form beliefs on the basis
of eventswhich did not happen butwere only imagined—since thiswould tend to result
in their having false beliefs about the world. As noted above, however, metacognitive
source monitoring processes enable subjects to discriminate between memories and
imaginings, even without access to what grounds this discrimination. Sufficiently
sensitive source monitoring mechanisms could ensure that an agent reliably forms
beliefs on the basis of memories and not on the basis of imaginings, avoiding the
maladaptive consequences of the latter, regardless of whether the agent has any beliefs
about the temporal status of remembered events.
Second, I’ve argued previously (Boyle 2019a) that storing episodic memories of
events increases opportunities for explicit semantic learning—something which may
be helpful in situations where it is not obvious what the ‘learning points’ are. Some-
times we are confronted with events which are difficult to interpret, meaning that we
can’t at the time draw out any useful information about how to anticipate or respond to
these situations. The capacity to store detailed memories of events enables us to revisit
them later on, reinterpreting them in the light of more recently acquired knowledge,
and extracting relevant information. Again, being able to locate remembered events in
time is not important for this purpose. One need not construe the remembered event as
7 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
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something which happened in the past—one might simply view it as an epistemically
significant representation of a certain kind of event.8
For instance, suppose I am a young chimpanzee learning to fish for termites, and I
notice that one ofmy conspecifics is havingmuch better luck thanme.But let’s suppose
that I cannot work out what the relevant difference is between me and my conspecific.
If I lack any understanding of time, but retain a memory of the event, I might treat it
as representative of a certain kind of thing that happens: my conspecific getting lots
of termites, using a certain kind of tool, on a certain kind of day. On a later occasion
when this or another conspecific is harvesting more termites than me, I might revisit
this memory. The commonalities between the current situation and the kind of event I
remember might suggest something: perhaps in both cases, my conspecific uses a tool
modified with a ‘brush’ tip, whilst I use an unmodified plant stem. This might prompt
me to try this technique, and to learn that the brush tool is more effective.9 As before,
for this use of episodic memories to be adaptive, it is not necessary that I construe
remembered events as located at some point in the past, so long as the representations
I use in this way are in fact of events located at some point in the past—that is, so
long as I reliably use memories in this way, and not mere imaginings. Once again,
this discrimination between memories and imaginings can be achieved through source
monitoring processes which do not require agent-level judgments about the location
of events in time.
Third, episodic memories also seem to play a role in supporting more implicit
semantic learning. There’s good evidence in humans that episodic memory plays a
role in facilitating the rapid acquisition of semantic information. As noted above, indi-
viduals with episodic amnesia—both developmental and adult-onset—are impaired
when it comes to the acquisition of semantic information. One explanation of this is
that information is initially encoded in episodic memory and then ‘replayed’ for the
benefit of semantic learning mechanisms, which can gradually extract information
from them. Without episodic memory, many more ‘real’ exposures to information are
required. In this way, episodic and semantic memory act as ‘complementary learning
systems’ (McClelland et al. 1995). Again, it does not seem important for episodic
memory to play this role that subjects be able to locate remembered events in time:
treating these memories as epistemically significant representations of events of cer-
tain kinds is sufficient. Of course, for this process to be adaptive, semantic memory
must reliably extract information from memories of events that did in fact occur, and
not from mere imaginings. But, again, the subject need not be capable of temporal
thought for this discrimination between memories and imaginings to be achieved.
The above considerations all concern episodic memory’s relationship to locating
remembered events in the past. This leaves open the relationship between episodically
remembering and having a realist conception of time. Of course, if a creature did
not even locate remembered events in the past, it’s unlikely that she would possess a
realist conception of time. But suppose that a creature does locate events in the past, in
Hoerl’s sense—that is, she treats certain events as being irrevocable, and as causally
8 Thanks to Christoph Hoerl for drawing my attention to this point.
9 To be clear, I use this example for illustrative purposes only; I don’t mean to suggest that memory in fact
plays this role in chimpanzees’ acquisition of tool-modification techniques.
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constraining the present. Should we thereby expect her to have a realist conception of
time—that is, to represent time as a domain in which all points are temporally related
to all other points, and which exists independently of the events occupying it?
There seems little reason to think so. First, to represent something as past, in this
sense, is to represent it as something which did happen. It is unclear how having
such a representation would give rise to a judgment to the effect that something else
might have happened at that time instead, and thereby to a conception of time as
event-independent. Second, to represent something as past in this sense is at most to
represent its temporal relationship to the present: because it has happened, it makes
an irrevocable difference to how things are now. But this is to say nothing about the
temporal relationships it (or the time it occupies) stands into other times—and so
it falls short of conceiving of time as a continuous domain. Teresa McCormack and
ChristophHoerl (2017) propose that childrenmay develop this minimal understanding
of the difference between past and future events between 2 and 3 years old. But this
capacity to discriminate those situations which can still be altered from those which,
having happened, cannot be altered differs considerably from having ‘one unified
model of the world within which time itself is represented’ (Hoerl and McCormack
2019, p. 11).
Locating a remembered event in the past, even in this minimal sense, increases the
cognitive work that one’s memory of that event can do. For one thing, recognising
that an event has happened and cannot be undone might lead one to realise that there
is no point dwelling on it (McCormack and Hoerl 2017, p. 310). More concretely, if
one treats the remembered event as constraining the present, one might draw certain
inferences about what must be true now, or what I ought to do now, given that the
event occurred. For instance, remembering an occasion on which I saw a sapling in a
certain spot, I might infer that there is likely to be a mature tree there now. Similarly,
remembering an interaction in which I was unduly harsh toward someone might lead
me to adopt a more conciliatory attitude when I meet them now. But treating events as
past in this sense does not provide for a sense of the temporal relationships between
remembered events, which limits the rational uses to which memories can be put. For
instance, suppose that I remember seeing Tina in the garden, and that I also have a
distinct memory of finding a book in the garden. If I represent these events as past but
can’t conceive of any temporal relations between them, certain inferences—such as
that Tina left her book in the garden—will be unavailable to me.
On the view I’ve proposed, episodic memory is memory for events, not memory
for the times they occupy: one can remember events without representing the times
they occupy, and without representing those times as event-independent. Episodic
memories which fail to locate events in the past or in event-independent time may
nevertheless play a number of productive roles in a creature’s cognitive economy.
So, we should take seriously the possibility that some creatures—perhaps nonhuman
animals and young children—have episodic memories, and yet lack any kind of com-
petence with temporal concepts. If this is right, then the straightforward evidential link
I considered above does not obtain: we should not infer from a lack of evidence for
temporal cognition in a creature that the creature lacks episodic memory.
In this section, I have assumed a relatively inclusive picture of episodic memory,
according to which episodic memories are those memories involving a single spatially
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organised construction of a scene. As I noted above, there exist a number of more
restrictive accounts of episodic memory, which view episodic memories as a proper
subset of the memories I have been discussing, characterised by the possession of
further distinguishing features. So, one might worry that perhaps when philosophers
have found it plausible to claim that episodic memory furnishes us with our concepts
of the past or of time, they had one of these less inclusive conceptions of episodic
memory in mind.10
Since it is difficult to rule this out, my argument can be viewed as limited in
scope. I’ve argued that there are good reasons to treat episodic memories as memories
involving spatially organised constructions of scenes; certainly, this idea is at the heart
of any plausible account of episodic memory, even where it is taken to have other
distinguishing features. I’ve argued that this kind of memory does not provide for an
understanding of the past: remembering events does not entail representing time. Of
course, this does not rule out that on some narrower construal of episodic memory, it
does furnish us with a concept of the past, in virtue of other features by which it is
characterised. Nevertheless, I think there are at least two reasons for scepticism.
First, the prima facie reason for thinking that episodic memory furnishes us with
temporal understanding is that it provides for direct awareness of the pastness of
events. But I’ve argued that whilst episodic memory may provide for direct awareness
of past events, there is no reason to think that it provides for direct awareness of their
pastness. In particular, the most plausible candidate feature of episodic memory for
providing a direct awareness of pastness is the so-called ‘feeling of pastness’. But, I’ve
argued, this is not a direct awareness of the pastness of events, but the felt outcome
of a metacognitive process enabling subjects to discriminate memories from other
cognitive phenomena. Since there is nothing intrinsically ‘past-ish’ about this feeling,
it is difficult to see how it could furnish a creature with temporal concepts. Rather, I’ve
suggested, we may call it a feeling of pastness becausewe possess temporal concepts.
This undercuts a central motivation for thinking that episodic memory furnishes us
with temporal understanding.
Second, one might suspect that on at least some narrower construals of episodic
memory, it depends developmentally on the possession of temporal concepts—and if
so, it could not be true that it furnishes us with them. For instance, take Mahr and
Csibra’s construal of episodic memories as those event memories agents explicitly
take themselves to remember. Since understanding what it is to remember something
entails knowing what it is for something to be in the past, remembering in this sense
is clearly sufficient for temporal understanding. But this tells us nothing about the
development of temporal understanding, unless we have an account of our capacity
to judge that we remember—and one might reasonably suspect that this turns on the
acquisition of temporal concepts. Similarly, take Keven’s account, according to which
episodic memories are characterised by the possession of causal, temporal and teleo-
logical structure, and not merely spatial structure. Keven argues that in humans, the
capacity for narrative storytelling is key to the development of this more sophisticated
form of memory—and one might think that developing the capacity for narrative sto-
rytelling involves acquiring at least some facility with temporal concepts. If that’s
10 Thanks to Christoph Hoerl for pressing me on this.
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right, then episodic memory in Keven’s sense is unlikely to be what furnishes us with
temporal concepts. More generally, making the case that episodic memory (on some
narrower construal) furnishes us with temporal concepts requires giving an account
of how episodic memory (in this narrower sense) might develop in the absence of
temporal understanding. But there is at least some reason to suspect that matters are
more complicated than this: that more sophisticated forms of episodic memory are
developmentally entangled with an emerging understanding of time.
Of course, it may be that even if episodicmemory does not furnish uswith a concept
of the past on these narrower construals, it nevertheless stands in interesting evidential
relationships to temporal cognition. For instance, clearly, if a creature has episodic
memory in Mahr and Csibra’s sense, then it must have some understanding of what
it is for an event to be past; this much is true by definition. But these evidential links
are unlikely to be entirely straightforward. We could not assume, for instance, that
a creature possessing a concept of the past would have episodic memory in Mahr
and Csibra’s sense since, aside from anything else, this also requires a capacity for
explicit metacognitive judgment. Similarly, there is no obvious reason to expect that a
creature possessing episodic memory in Mahr and Csibra’s sense would have a realist
conception of time, or any concept of the future. So, whilst evidential connections
may exist between narrower construals of episodic memory and temporal cognition,
determining the precise nature of those connections requires careful attention to the
details of the relevant construal of episodic memory, and to the varieties of temporal
cognition.
5 Conclusions
In Sect. 2, I argued that the evidence of amnesia casts some doubt on the dependency
thesis, according to which episodic memory is necessary for possessing the concept
of the past, or a realist conception of time. In Sects. 3 and 4, I defended an account of
episodic memories according to which they are event memories—memories involving
spatially structured scene constructions of events—and argued that on this account,
episodic memory is not sufficient for possessing temporal concepts. There could be
creatures with episodic memory which lack any capacity to represent time. None
of this, however, shows that episodic memory and temporal cognition are unrelated.
Quite the opposite: it suggests that the relationship between episodic memory and
temporal understanding may be more complex than the dependency and sufficiency
theses indicate.
First, to say that episodic memory is neither necessary nor sufficient for temporal
understanding does not rule out that it plays a role in the development of temporal
understanding in healthy individuals. In fact, it seems likely that the two develop in par-
allel. Linguistic instruction may be sufficient for developing temporal understanding
even in the absence of episodic memory. But where temporally unanchored episodic
memories are present, they provide a resource for introducing temporal notions through
something like ostension. Utterances like ‘remember the time when we…?’ might
prompt the retrieval of a temporally unanchored memory, telling children something
about the significance of temporal terms and tense. These collective acts of reminisc-
123
2522 Synthese (2021) 199:2505–2524
ing, as well as providing children with a foothold on temporal properties and relations,
also provide their memories with an organisational structure, locating them within an
increasingly complex temporal framework (Nelson and Fivush 2004), and perhaps
facilitate the development of more complex forms of memory. Consistently with this,
cross-cultural data suggest a correlation between the frequency and elaborateness with
which parents reminisce, and both the age at which children report memories, and the
level of detail in their memory reports (Van Bergen and Sutton 2019). As Penny Van
Bergen and John Sutton (2019) argue, this provides for a sense in which autobio-
graphical memory, understood to be a compound capacity involving episodic memory
alongside other components, perhaps including an understanding of time, could be
what Cecilia Heyes (2018) calls a ‘cognitive gadget’—a complex cognitive capacity
which is culturally transmitted, but which builds on a simpler genetically inherited
capacity. If anything like this view is correct, then it is not that remembering and
representing time are unrelated, but that their relationship cannot be straightforwardly
captured in terms of necessity and sufficiency—and this is so whether we are talk-
ing about episodic memory, in the sense offered here, or a more complex, compound
capacity like autobiographical memory.
Second, although I have been arguing against a straightforward evidential con-
nection between temporal cognition and episodic memory in nonhumans, there are
nevertheless theoretically important relationships between these two capacities. It
should be clear from the foregoing that there are roles that episodic memory plays
in the mental lives of humans only because we are able to locate remembered events
in time. Lacking the temporal concepts this requires would correspondingly limit the
cognitive work a creature’s episodic memories could do. If a creature remembers an
event but does not represent it as past, then she will not appreciate the way in which the
remembered event constrains the present. For instance, as noted above, she will not be
able to infer that there is likely to be a mature tree in a given spot now given that she
saw a seedling there earlier—since she does not locate her memory of the seedling in
the past. So, whilst her memory may play a number of adaptive roles in her cognitive
economy, there will nevertheless be limits to the uses she can put it to. Moreover, if
she represents an event as past but not as occupying event-independent time, she will
not understand certain things about how it temporally and causally relates to other
remembered events, or about how things might have been different. This, again, will
limit the role that her memory can play in her rational thought and action. So, if the
evidence suggests that animals lack temporal concepts, we should not conclude that
they lack episodic memory—but we should revise our theoretical predictions about
how they ought to behave if they do.
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